Why are there 7 days in a week?


Many Christians and Muslims would have you believe the 7 calendar days were brought on by the creation of the universe brought about by their God in genesis. Others more enlightened would say it was popularize by the Roman’s with the Julian calendar and what followed the Georgian calendar. While this is somewhat true, the concept of a 7 day week existed and was popularized long before that of the Roman state by the Jewish state; and even long before that with the Mesopotamian empires. Sargon of Akkad was known to conquer cities and establish 7 day calendar weeks.

The real answer is simple and it lays in the cycle of the moon phases. The early Babylonians-Mesopotamian astronomers observed the moon life cycles to be approximately 29.5 calendar days, which they rounded down to 28, and then divided that by 4 periods of 7 days even calculating leap days. The name of each day was after the 7 classical planets. The leap years were more so established and popularized by the Romans. So now you know. 😉



There are many reasons we already do limit speech and regulate it to some degree. Speaking specifically here in the America’s, we already have laws that limit speech for issues like breech of privacy, by court order, and of course for inciting violence. But here are 7 philosophical reasons that we ought limit freedom of speech even further,

1) Because we all fall under the social contract. (No, it’s not a piece of paper. It means when you live amongst a society then it is necessary to relinquish certain freedoms in order to peacefully co-exist. I would argue this is a logical absolute. In order to have a free society or ANY society you must relinquish certain freedoms as to not breach the freedoms and rights of another). Thank Thomas Hobbs for that one.

2) Because hate speech is harmful and abusive, which should be rightfully limited by the government. (The old platitude “sticks and stones may break my bones but words don’t hurt”, is both silly and wrong. Words do hurt! Words can have a positive and negative affect on others. This goes into Mill’s no harm principle, that the only times a government can/ought exercise power is when it harms others).

3) Because it appeals to our civil liberties, (Let’s remember in civics limiting rights is part and parcel of having civil rights because there are positive and negative rights. Yes, you have the freedom to things but also from things).

4) Because within a Republic everything is self-correcting. (The beauty of a republic is that we are always able to revisit old statues and amend them at any time. So if we were to limit freedom of speech nothing would be absolute. So even if we struggle to understand what is harmful and abusive speech we can always go back and revisit old statutes and discuss them in a ceremonious way).

5) Limiting free speech doesn’t limit speech, (There’s an argument to be made that constraints lead to creativity. You may have heard of the term flash-fiction in literature, stories with extreme brevity. One of the most famous being the 6 word story often attributed to Ernest Hemingway. Or probably an even more famous version of flash-fiction Haiku. So it could be argued that limiting free speech and certain types of words could create more meaningful dialog).

6) Because free-speech cannot be avoided. (There’s an argument by the late legal philosopher Joel Feinberg called the offensive principle. But the name is very misleading, it should rather be called the avoidance principle. Feinberg argues that limiting speech that is heinous and offensive is necessary because it has an adverse affect on our daily lives. Feinberg would argue that things like publications, artistic works, and even certain public spheres would be protected given that they can easily be avoided and have no greater effect on any person’s daily life).

7) Free-speech silences others? (This plays into the concept of tyranny of the majority but as J.S. Mill wrote tyranny of decided opinion or the deep slumber of decided opinion. J.S. Mill criticized the conformist society as suppressing dissenting – unpopular opinions; however, it should be noted Mill’s conclusion was in favor of the modern day concept of free-speech. But it should also be noted that this was not his argument. His argument raises the question as to the nature of conformist societies and whether they foster such environments where views and opinions of minorities can be expressed fully.)

Explanation: Let’s not fall into a perfect solution fallacy. I’m not saying that limiting free-speech will solve everything but it will definitely deter people from using abusive speech to hurt others. Now I don’t care what you agree or disagree with, this isn’t 1984 thought policing, but I would argue that it’s more in terms of how you say something. Even the most dense of people and my most argent detractors can spot the difference between the writings of St. Jerome vs the West Borough Baptist Church. The former is tolerable, even though I disagree, but the later is purely intolerable and should rightfully be suppressed because that type of speech is abusive and harmful to others.



“People demand freedom of speech to make up for the freedom of thought which they seldom use” – Soren Kierkegaard

– Jubilee Nunnallee 6/11/2017


p02pkxlyArgument from Inconsistent Revelation (AIR), although this is my own version.

P1 – Internally inconsistent claims are always false.
P2 – All epistemological claims to a God are through divine revelation.
P3 – Given (P1&P2) Any divine revelatory statement, that makes a claim to a God, is internally inconsistent.
Conclusion – Given (P1&P3) God does not exist as a consequence.

Explanation: This is a deductive argument so I make no assumptions about the conclusion, I’m stating that all of the premises are true making the conclusion true. When I speak of inconsistency I’m specifically speaking of ‘internal’ inconsistency. One should note the difference between logical inconsistency and internal inconsistency. Although not mutually exclusive, an internally inconsistent claim is necessarily false, logical inconsistent claims are simply invalid. Take the statement, for example, “King Charles I was both beheaded and not beheaded”, would be an internally inconsistent statement and needs no other premise to prove it. Revelatory claims of a God or supreme being(s) are always inconsistent because the appeal to the ineffability of language, stating that a supreme being is divinely caused and the beliefs surrounding that supreme being are divinely inspired is completely tautological. To make a claim about a divinely supreme being cannot be grounded into any set of concrete definitions and is therefore internally inconsistent.

–  Jubilee Nunnallee 6/9/2017

Gender Dysphoria vs Transgenderism | The Disorder vs the Condition

There’s been an ongoing debate happening, a lot of deliberation as to validly of Transgenderism as a rational position, and as a Transgender woman I feel this discussion is taking place without me, so this is me joining the fray.

The first issue I want to discuss here, and this is something I hear come up a lot, is the assertion that Transgenderism is a mental illness. And I’m here to say that’s completely false. Transgenderism is no more a mental disorder than Drapetomania is. But Genderist still say otherwise.    

But people who normally use this argument equivocate the use of the term’s Transgenderism with Gender Dysphoria and treat the two terms as if there synonymous, they’ll usually quote rehashed ideas or known misnomers from the DSM series or the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in support of this claim. But what they don’t understand is that the two terms are indifferent, and regardless of the politics surrounding the APA, the APA does not treat Transgenderism as a mental psychosis.

The truth is not all Transgender people have Gender Dysphoria. Gender Dysphoria is a mental illness when it becomes a dysphoria – a distress for the person who may be struggling with accepting or understanding their gender identity. This definition is reflected in the official term “Gender Dysphoria” which emphases Dysphoria – distress for the individual. This is clearly stated in the DSM5 fact sheet which states

“It is important to note that gender nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder. The critical element of gender dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress associated with the condition.”

And if you go through the APA classification of Transgenderism vs Gender Dysphoria fact sheet it states quote.

“A psychological state is considered a mental disorder only if it causes significant distress or disability. Many transgender people do not experience their gender as distressing or disabling, which implies that identifying as transgender does not constitute a mental disorder.”

This is also reflected in the APA standard treatment for Transgender individuals helping them cope and accept who they are, it’s in no way treated as a mental psychosis.

In fact clinical psychologist Dr. Robin Rosenberg is quoted as saying it does not cause the individual distress! For instance, many transgender people, those who identify with a gender different than the one they were assigned at birth, are not distressed by their cross-gender identification and should not be diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

If you think this is some wild supposition or conspiratorial theory tell me if this sounds familiar. When the APA struggled to update the DSM2 in 1973 with newer progressive views on homosexuality. An updated was made to the DSM3 in 1980 which replaced homosexuality with “ego-dystonic homosexuality”—homosexuality that causes distress for the person; that diagnosis however, was completely removed in 1987 and is obviously no longer considered a mental disorder.

You see this is the same playbook we see here we see with gender dysphoria, because call me Nostradamus, but it’s likely gender dysphoria is going to be phased out in much the same way. But for now let’s treat the term as it’s officially used and practiced by the APA and by the British Psychological Society, that Gender Dysphoria happens when you’re distressed over being Transgender not that fact that you are Transgender.

– Jubilee Nunnallee


Epydemic2020| Euthyphro Dilemma

  • This is going to be a response to an old friend of mine Epydemic2020 and the Euthyphro Dilemma, a theologian and an assistant professor of philosophy.

    Video link here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SoyuRJncKg

    Now as you watch this video notice how Epidemic simply dismiss the Euthyphro Dilemma as a false dilemma-dichotomy by claiming a 3rd option, and this ‘3rd option’ is what is in question. The classical version of the argument can be found in Plato’s dialog and appeals to the pious of the Gods, but the modern version raises the question as to the validity of God and morality, and it goes as such.

    “Is an action good because it is good or is an action good because God commands it to be?”

    – Plato

    Now this dilemma is meant to be a counter rebuttal to the argument of divine command theory, in that moral law is commanded by a divine being (God). So since it’s inception this argument has often presented a vexing problem for theist because no matter how you answer it’s still going to run contrary to divine command theory. If you answer the first proposition, an action is good because it’s good, then we can reason that actions are inherently good within themselves and we would not need a God or divine being to determine them. If you answer proposition two, God commands moral acts, then morality is simply subjective and arbitrary to God’s will; if God commands it to be moral so shall it be.

    But the common theistic response to this argument is to claim that God can command what is moral because it’s consistent with his own moral nature, with this theists may claim victory and say at the very least they’ve shown it to be a false dichotomy by claiming a third option; but the problem may still remain. Let’s take a closer look at this response. Epidemic says if it is even possible that there is a 3rd option then the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma.

    “God’s nature, aka his essential properties, is the standard of Goodness”.

    – Epydemic2020

    So what Epydemic is saying here is that God can command moral acts because it’s consistent and/or essential to his own moral nature, so let’s consider that assertion for a moment – that being God’s moral nature. Now does this escape the problem or is this even a possible 3rd option; no, not at all! What Epydemic has done here, as well as many others who uses this argument, is what’s known as a fallacy of suppressed-correlative. A fallacy of suppressed-correlative is committed when given a dichotomy of X or Y one makes a definitional argument to which includes both X & Y thereby avoiding any mutually exclusive option from being made, similar to the fallacy Loki’s wager.

    The theistic response of God commanding what is moral because it is consistent with his moral nature, is just proposition one & two thrown together. So God both commands and is the embodiment of morality. But If God commands what is moral because he is moral by his very nature then this is not only fallacious but also reaffirms the same problem of how we judge moral claims. Remember proposition one, an action is good because it’s good? To say that God can command what is moral because he acts morally means that moral acts are still the basis in how we judge moral claims. A good follow up question to this response would be, well how do you know that God is moral? The answer is obvious, well it’s because God acts morally. Bam! fallen right back into proposition one. So we can see that even if we try and avert the problem by making an entirely new claim by including both proposition one & two together, the problem of proposition one still remains. If God’s ‘nature’ is to mean that it is simply consistent with moral acts then moral acts are still inherently good in and of themselves, God is simply consistent with them. But even if a Theist tries to obfuscating the use of the term nature and its meaning, as to say it is not how God acts but what God is… then this is just a semantic word salad that just creates more problems for the theist because I would then ask what God’s moral nature is and if they even try to use terms like virtue-moral characteristics then they’ve again fallen right back into proposition one or the problem of proposition one, moral acts being the basis of how we judge moral claims.

    So you can say this 3rd option doesn’t exist; so if anyone who uses this argument hasn’t escaped Euthyphro at all they’ve just simply reworded it.

Philosophy of Transgenderism – Birth and Plurality

Introduction to the argument “You weren’t born that way!”, a simple statement but used ad nauseum in opposition against several different issues.  And it’s not just transgender people which this argument is mainly used against. I mean we could bring up other issues, such as racism, immigration, classism, even feminism and women’s rights. But let’s […]

Argument from Contingency – Theologica37


This is going to be a response to Theologica37 and his video entitled Arguments from Contingency: Thomistic/Leibnizian. Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsEvxew8YOs

Theologica37, which from this point on I’ll be referring to as Theo, puts forth the argument from contingency as he uses both Leibniz and the Thomistic versions of the argument. The argument from contingency goes as such: “For every contingent entity that exists requires an explanation for its existence. Since an explanation for all contingent entities cannot be itself contingent, it thus requires an explanation that exists by necessity, this necessary explanation is God”.

The PSR Defined

The main presupposition within this argument is in the form of a reductio ad absurdum as it argues the absurdity of an infinite regress of causal explanations, which cannot go on ad infinitum, so therefore we must posit a necessary explanation. Now I will grant that Theo is correct in that we must posit a non-contingent explanation in order to explain why contingent entities exist. But what I do reject is the regression argument. Theo seems to view existence as some sort of succession and from what we know of existence this is simply not true.

The regression argument is sort of self leading, as it wants you to use or keep using sufficient explanations which we eventually have to do away with using, because a sufficient explanation would require an explanation that is dependent, and therefore contingent upon something else to explain it, and that in turn would require another explanation, and eventually we’ll have to come up with an infinite series of explanations that could go on ad infinitum. Now this may seem frustrating and it can be, philosophy can be a scary thing. But the questions within the argument from contingency are obviously fallacious as its rhetoric presupposes a causal oversimplification. It’s responses are limited to singular explanations of causal events rather than a multiplicity of causal events, when the person asks “well what causes this event and then what causes that event“? If you didn’t catch it you should already see the problem within the initial question, you could not possibly account for existing entities using an infinite series of causal explanations. What the theist is trying to do here is get you into a position where you’re forced to omit that since an infinite series of causal explanations is impossible to account for pre-existing entities we must therefore conclude that there was this singular explanation that is contingent upon a necessary being (God). 

My Rebuttal

So basically casual events occur and since they occur then they must be explained by an external cause that is contingent upon it. The argument presupposes the idea of predeterminism. Now predeterminism, not to be confused with determinism, would argue that contemporary states of events are ultimately determined by a chain of prior states of events leading back to its origins. Now I think this is where me and Theo part ways metaphysically. I think the disagreement lies mainly in how we view existing entities to be accounted for, which is either sequentially, as he would put it, entities being sufficient upon prior states of events, or in a monistic manner, as I would put it, entities being relational to its foundational properties. Now to put it simply my rebuttal to this argument is that… to account for existing entities is non-sequential as existing entities have unity within essence and are also limited within essence; & I’ll of course explain what this means.

But first let me show the logical implications I’m working from, when I speak of unity within existence I’m of course speaking of the monistic idea of reality. Monism or more specifically substance monism fundamentally is the idea of substance having universal qualities within every kind of existing thing, every kind of thing is relational in some sense. All entities have some form of relatable substance that is foundational, this is quintessential of existence. The laws of physics even complement substance monism. I’m sure we’ve all heard the old mantra energy may not be created nor destroyed it simply changes. You may have heard of other laws based off this, such as the conservation of energy and the conservation of mass, these laws of physics are monistic in the sense that they all agree that change is constant and is not quantifiable. So we can understand at least on both an axiological and scientific sense in how the monistic theory of metaphysics shows that substance/essence is axiomatic for all contingent entities to exist because substance/essence is the primary state of existence.

Now the idea that entities are both limited and have unity is where we get the concept of potency and act. Theo mentions the Thomistic version. But for clarity I’m going to use the original Aristotelian version. We can understand potency to be the potential or foundational substance that to which can remain itself while taking on new modifications. And the act, or actual properties, is the change by which the potency becomes actualized or overtly present within itself. So potency is the essence that persist within every kind of change that is potential for every kind of actual property and act is what limits potency within an actual property.

But as Aristotle points out, potency is necessary for any act, in that act can only occur if there is some foundational substance in which it is capable of becoming another kind of existing thing. You may have heard the saying “there are no contraries to substance”, this is Aristotle. Substance has no contraries to itself. There must be a foundational substance for any potency to be possible in becoming another existing thing.

So potency is this foundational substance, and it is itself axiomatic because nothing that exists or nothing that which could exist could be caused without a preexisting foundational substance to account for it. So potency can be said to have unity within every Act; it is the foundation that persists through every actual existing thing. And act, the thing that is modified or formed, is what becomes limited through potency. So this is where again we get the idea of entities having unity within essence, as there are no contraries to substance, every kind of existing thing is related to substance. And entities also being limited within essence as entities, or actual existing things, are limited by what makes it distinct, given its accidental properties.

Now I don’t think Theo himself even disagrees with this concept as he even admits in his video that a foundational substance is necessary, as he uses the metaphysical Thomistic version of potency and act: “Contingent beings are composed of potency of act and essence of existence, there must be a proportion between any act and the potency which receives it”. Now we see that Theo freely acknowledges that there must be some form of proportion as he puts it, that must exist between potency and any act which receives it. Now he defines potency as, or I should say rather, the principle by which the proportion/substance is obtained in the act. And the act or the accidental property is well pretty much the same in the original Aristotelian version – the change by which the potency becomes actualized or overtly present within itself.

In Closing

So the very fact that a contingent entity requires a necessary explanation ‘granted’, than that necessary explanation is potency the foundational substance for all existing things; for there can be no act or cause without first establishing some aspect of a necessary foundational substance which could have influenced it.

Given that there is this potency/foundational substance that persist through any & all actual existing properties, then there is no reason to assume that there is this sub-sequential limit to existing entities, and this is really the only point I’ve been making, because all existent entities can be accounted for by a universal foundational substance found in all existing or potential properties, therefore the argument from contingency fails, because to ultimately account for existing entities can be explained through its relation, not causation.

– ImymeJubilee